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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal is a part of multi-district product liability 
litigation, involving manufacturers of orthopedic bone screw 
devices. The district court, sitting as the transferee court, 
imposed the ultimate sanction of dismissing plaintiff's suit 
with prejudice for failure to comply with discovery orders. 
Because we find that the district court lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction of the case, we must determine whether 
it had the ability to impose the sanction of dismissal with 
prejudice. 
 
Facts and Procedural Background 
 
The appellant, William Michael Ray, originally filed this 
action as a pro se petition in Kansas state court, seeking 
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damages for personal injuries allegedly incurred as the 
result of the implantation of an internal spinalfixation 
device. Ray sued Sofamor, Inc., a Tennessee manufacturer 
and distributor of pedicle screw devices; his physician, Dr. 
Robert Eyster of Kansas; and St. Joseph Medical Center, a 
Kansas hospital where Ray underwent surgery. Four 
months later, defendants removed the case to federal court 
in the District of Kansas, alleging federal question 
jurisdiction. They contended that the case presented a 
federal question because it arose under the Medical Devices 
Amendments and Safe Medical Device Act ("MDA") to the 
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. S 301, et. 
seq. The action was then transferred to the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania as 
part of Multi-District Litigation ("MDL") 1014, known as the 
Bone Screw Litigation. 
 
After Ray filed his pro se petition, he became a plaintiff in 
a separate action filed in Tennessee, also alleging bone 
screw related claims. Ray is represented by counsel in the 
Tennessee action, Eugene Haffey, et al. v. Danek Medical, 
Inc., which was also transferred to MDL 1014. Counsel for 
Ray in Haffey is now representing him in this appeal. 
Counsel maintains, however, that he was not aware of the 
pro se action or of its removal and transfer to the MDL until 
after defendants had filed a motion to dismiss it as a result 
of Ray's failure to comply with discovery. 
 
Prior to the transfer of Ray's pro se action, the multi- 
district transferee court had issued several orders governing 
pretrial procedures and discovery. In particular, Pretrial 
Order 6 required plaintiffs in MDL 1014 to provide 
defendants with answers to a questionnaire and with 
authorizations for the release of medical records. When 
Ray's pro se action was transferred to MDL 1014, it was 
covered by PTO 6.1 Ray failed, however, to submit the 
required documents. On September 15, 1995, defendants 
informed the Plaintiffs' Legal Committee (appointed by the 
District Court to represent plaintiffs in MDL 1014) that Ray 
had failed to comply with PTO 6 and that, if noncompliance 
continued, defendants would file a motion to dismiss. App. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Ray was served with PTO 6 on June 12, 1995. See App. 67. 
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at 80. Defendants also wrote Ray a letter. On November 13, 
1995, defendants moved to dismiss Ray's petition for failure 
to comply with PTO 6. It is at this point that Ray's counsel 
in Haffey claims to have become aware of Ray's pro se 
action. Counsel then filed a motion in opposition to the 
motion to dismiss. 
 
Because motions to dismiss for noncompliance with 
pretrial orders had been filed in other MDL 1014 actions as 
well as Ray's, the court had appointed a Special Discovery 
Master. The Special Discovery Master recommended that 
dismissal with prejudice be the sanction used to resolve 
these motions. The district court adopted this 
recommendation and ordered that Ray and other 
noncompliant plaintiffs appear to show cause why their 
actions should not be dismissed with prejudice. 
 
Counsel for Ray appeared at the show cause hearing. 
Ray, however, was not present. The record reveals the 
district court's understandable confusion during this 
proceeding due to the fact that Ray was a pro se litigant in 
one case and was represented by counsel in another. App. 
121-138. The district court ordered a subsequent hearing 
at which Ray was specifically and pointedly instructed to be 
present. Notice was mailed the following day to Ray, 
notifying him of the July 9, 1996, hearing. On July 8, 
counsel for Ray filed a motion for continuance on the 
grounds that he had been unable to contact Ray. Neither 
counsel nor Ray was present at the July 9 proceeding. The 
district court therefore imposed the sanction of dismissing 
this case with prejudice for failure to comply with discovery. 
The court also held Ray in contempt for his failure to 
appear and imposed a $500 monetary sanction on him. 2 
 
At the same time that the discovery motions were being 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The order dismissing Ray's petition does not indicate under which rule 
the judge imposed the sanction of dismissal for Ray's failure to comply 
with an order of the court. We have held that Rule 37 is the applicable 
rule in such cases. In addition, Rule 16(f), which provides sanctions for 
failure to comply with pretrial and scheduling orders of the court, 
incorporates the sanctions under Rule 37 by reference, including the 
Rule 37(b)(2)(C) provision for dismissal for failure to comply with 
discovery orders. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f). 
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resolved, the district court was also considering several 
motions by other MDL plaintiffs to remand their actions to 
state court. These actions had been removed to federal 
court on the basis of federal preemption under the MDA. 
On June 20, 1996, the district court issued Pretrial Order 
409, finding that "[b]ecause the [Medical Devices 
Amendments to the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act] 
do not completely preempt state law, they do not provide 
Federal jurisdiction." In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Products 
Liability Litigation, MDL 1014. 1996 WL 900348 (E.D. Pa. 
June 20, 1996). The district court then granted the motions 




Ray bases his appeal on his contention that, because the 
district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over 
his claim, it did not have the authority to impose the 
sanction of dismissal with prejudice for failure to comply 
with discovery orders. We will begin our discussion with the 
issue of subject matter jurisdiction. The parties concede 
that there is no federal question jurisdiction in this case. 
The parties also agree that there is no diversity of 
citizenship. Thus, the district court did not have subject 
matter jurisdiction of Ray's action. For this reason, Ray 
questions the ability of the district court to have sanctioned 
him by dismissing his action with prejudice. 
 
The defendants argue, however, that Ray's petition was 
properly before the court at the time it was dismissed and 
that, even if the court lacked jurisdiction, it had the 
inherent authority to dismiss the case with prejudice for 
failure to comply with court orders. As transferee court in 
MDL 1014, the district court was dealing with hundreds of 
transferred actions which had been brought by plaintiffs in 
courts all over the country. Ray filed his pro se petition in 
January of 1995 in state court. In April, the defendants 
removed Ray's action to federal district court in Kansas on 
the basis of complete preemption by federal law under the 
MDA. In June, Ray's case was transferred to MDL 1014 in 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Although Ray did not 
move to remand, the district court did decide in numerous 
other actions that no such preemption existed under the 
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MDA.3 The defendants contend that, since the definitive 
Supreme Court ruling in Medtronic v. Lohr, 116 S.Ct. 2240, 
2254-58 (1996) (finding that the MDA does not completely 
preempt state causes of action) was issued on June 26, 
1996, only days before the district court sanctioned Ray 
with dismissal, his pro se action was properly before the 
district court. We disagree. 
 
The district court had considered the issue of federal 
preemption by the MDA with regard to other cases which 
had been removed to federal court and then transferred to 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania as part of MDL 1014. 
The only basis for removal of these cases was the alleged 
existence of a federal question based on the MDA. This was 
also the basis for the removal of Ray's petition. In PTO 409, 
the district court concluded that there was no federal 
question jurisdiction and remanded the challenged cases 
back to the state courts where they had originated. As Ray 
did not move for remand of his case, his petition was not 
among those cases remanded by PTO 409. 
 
Nevertheless, the defendants contend that, until a 
determination was made that the district court lacked 
jurisdiction in Ray's case, the court properly exercised its 
inherent authority to order discovery and conduct 
proceedings. This authority, they contend, included the 
authority to sanction Ray for lack of procedural compliance 
by dismissing the action with prejudice. The defendants 
make much of the fact that Ray never moved to remand his 
case and did not raise subject matter jurisdiction in the 
district court. Had Ray moved to remand his pro se action 
for lack of jurisdiction, no doubt the jurisdictional issue 
would have been resolved expeditiously. However, it is 
fundamental that a court may consider jurisdiction on its 
own. The issue of jurisdiction is always open for 
determination by the court. Underwood v. Maloney, 256 
F.2d 334 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 864 (1958). 
 
If a court then determines that it lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction, it cannot decide the case on the merits. It has 
no authority to do so. A federal court can only exercise that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Pretrial Order 409, 1996 WL 900348 (E.D. Pa.) ( June 20, 1996), citing 
Michael v. Shiley, 46 F.3d 1316 (3d Cir. 1995). 
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power granted to it by Article III of the Constitution and by 
the statutes enacted pursuant to Article III. Bender v. 
Williamsport, 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986); Marbury v. 
Madison, 1 Cranch (5 U.S.) 137, 173-80 (1803); see also 
Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 137 (1992) (noting 
that "[a] final determination of lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction of a case in a federal court, of course, precludes 
further adjudication of it."). If a case, over which the court 
lacks subject matter jurisdiction, was originallyfiled in 
federal court, it must be dismissed. If it was removed from 
state court, it must be remanded. See Bradgate Associates 
v. Fellows, Read & Associates, 999 F.2d 745, 750-51 (3d 
Cir. 1993) (finding that, where the district court lacks 
subject matter jurisdiction, it must remand a removed state 
court case, and it must dismiss a case, originallyfiled in 
federal court). The disposition of such a case will, however, 
be without prejudice. See, e.g., Winslow v. Walters, 815 
F.2d 1114, 1116 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that "a ruling 
granting a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction is not on the merits; its res judicata effect is 
limited to the question of jurisdiction."); Verret v. Elliot 
Equip. Corp., 734 F.2d 235, 238 (5th Cir. 1984) ("it would 
be inappropriate to enter any judgment on the merits when 
the dismissal is based on lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction"). 
 
However, despite this inability of a court to decide the 
merits of a case over which it lacks jurisdiction, a court 
does have inherent authority both over its docket and over 
the persons appearing before it. It has long been recognized 
that courts are vested with certain inherent powers that are 
not conferred either by Article III or by statute, but rather 
are necessary to all other functions of courts. U.S. v. 
Hudson, 7 Cranch 32, 34 (1812); Roadway Express Inc. v. 
Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 64, 100 S.Ct. 2455, 63 (1980). Of 
course, implicit in all these powers is the power to sanction. 
 
The Supreme Court has recognized the inherent power of 
courts to impose sanctions in order to manage their own 
affairs and achieve orderly and expeditious disposition of 
cases. Chambers v. NASCO Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43; 111 S. Ct. 
123, 32 (1991). These powers include the power to manage 
their dockets and impose silence and order on those before 
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the court. Link v. Wabash, 370 U.S. 626, 30-31, 82 S.Ct. 
1386, 88-89 (1962). In addition courts have the authority to 
punish contempt whether the sanctioned conduct is before 
the court or beyond it. Ex parte Robinson, 19 Wall. 505, 
510 (1874). Nevertheless, even though the choice of 
sanction may be within the court's discretion, this power is 
not without limit. Link v. Wabash, 447 U.S. at 765. 
 
The question we face here is whether the inherent power 
to sanction extends in a case, over which the court lacks 
subject matter jurisdiction, to permit the court to impose a 
sanction which will be dispositive of the merits of the case. 
We think not. 
 
We come to this conclusion despite the fact that we 
recognize that there is abundant authority permitting the 
imposition of sanctions in the absence of jurisdiction over 
a case. The Supreme Court held unanimously in Willy v. 
Coastal Corp. that the absence of jurisdiction will not 
operate automatically to invalidate all proceedings below. 
The Willy Court, however, addressed the imposition of Rule 
11 sanctions, awarding attorneys' fees incurred in 
responding to sanctionable conduct. Willy did not involve a 
dismissal with prejudice. In approving the sanction in Willy, 
the Court relied in large measure on the principle that 
Article III concerns are not implicated by Rule 11 sanctions 
since they are collateral to the merits and do not result in 
the Court assessing the legal merits of a complaint over 
which it lacks jurisdiction. Courts have an interest in 
maintaining order. For this reason, Rule 11 sanctions, 
which are imposed on persons appearing before the court, 
may be upheld in the absence of jurisdiction where they are 
consistent with a court's inherent power to manage its 
docket and maintain order. Permitting the imposition of 
Rule 11 sanctions by a court, later found to lack 
jurisdiction over the case, does not affect the 
appropriateness of such sanctions. Willy, 503 U.S. at 138. 
 
Defendants contend that the Supreme Court's holding in 
Willy is applicable to this case. We conclude, however, that 
Willy is not controlling here because Willy involved a 
sanction collateral to the merits of the case. The sanction of 
dismissal with prejudice, imposed on Ray, is not collateral 
to the merits. It acts to terminate the cause of action. A 
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court's power to determine the merits of a case is distinct 
from its power to exercise its authority over a person 
appearing before the court. This distinction is inherent in 
the reliance by the Court in Willy on the notion that Rule 
11 sanctions could stand in the absence of jurisdiction 
because they were collateral to the merits of the action and 
did not signal a legal conclusion by the sanctioning court. 
The defendants seek to obscure this difference. We 
conclude, however, that where, as here, the court lacks 
subject matter jurisdiction, it may not act in a way that 
determines the cause of action even though it may still--as 
in Willy--exercise its authority over the person before the 
court in the interest of enforcing compliance with the 
court's procedures. A court has an interest in enforcing 
cooperation with its orders by persons appearing before the 
court whether it has jurisdiction or not. A court also has an 
interest in deterring noncompliant behavior by future 
litigants. National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey 
Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643; 96 S.Ct. 2778, 2781 (1976). 
However, where jurisdiction is found to be lacking, there 
can be no adjudication of the merits of the case. This 
prohibition must bar the imposition of a sanction which will 
terminate the case on the merits. For this reason, we will 
leave undisturbed the District Court's $500 monetary 





In this case, the already complicated task of the 
transferee court in multi-district litigation was made more 
so by Ray's failure to comply with the district court's 
orders. We recognize the need for the district court to be 
able to enforce compliance with its rules. Where, however, 
the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, it could 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. For the reasons we have stated, we disagree with the conclusion 
reached by the Ninth Circuit in In re Exxon Valdez, 102 F.3d 429 (9th 
Cir. 1996) and by the Second Cicuit in Hernandez v. Conriv Realty 
Assoc., 116 F.3d 35 (2d Cir. 1997) that, despite a lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, a district court may dismiss a case with prejudice as a 
sanction for repeated discovery violations. 
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not impose a sanction that has the effect of adjudicating 
the merits of the case. We will, therefore, affirm the 
imposition of the monetary sanction, but we will vacate the 
dismissal of the case with prejudice and remand this case 
to the District Court with instructions to remand it to the 
state court. 
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